Autonomy, Slavery, and Mill’s Critique of Paternalism
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, (2001)Abstract
Author’s abstract: Critics have charged that John Stuart Mill’s discussion
as of paternalism in On Liberty is internally inconsistent, noting,
for example, the numerous instances in which Mill explicitly endorses
examples of paternalistic coercion. Similarly, commentators have
noted an apparent contradiction between Mill’s political liberalism
– according to which the state should be neutral among competing
conceptions of the good – and Mill’s condemnation of non-autonomous
ways of life, such as that of a servile wife. More generally, critics
have argued that while Mill professes an allegiance to utilitarianism,
he actually abandons it in favor of a view that values personal autonomy
as the greatest intrinsic good. This paper presents an interpretation
of Mill that provides a viable and consistent treatment of paternalism,
thereby refuting each of the aforementioned critiques. Mill’s views,
it argues, are consistently utilitarian. Moreover, the interpretation
accounts for all of Mill’s departures from his otherwise blanket
prohibition of paternalistic legislation. In particular, it explains
his most notorious example, the condemnation of voluntary contracts
for slavery. The interpretation emphasizes Mill’s conceptual linkage
between autonomy and utility, noting his implicit use of at least
three different senses of the notion of autonomy.