When there are competing technologies or products with unknown payoffs an important question is which technology will prevail and whether technologies with different payoffs can coexist in the long run. In this paper, we use a social learning model with local interactions to study this question. We show that the adoption of technologies as well as the prospects of conformism/diversity depend crucially on the nature of interaction between individuals and the heterogeneity of preferences in a society.
Bala2001 - Conformism and diversity under social learning.pdf:Evolutionary Game Theory/Bala2001 - Conformism and diversity under social learning.pdf:PDF
%0 Journal Article
%1 Bala2001
%A Bala, Venkatesh
%A Goyal, Sanjeev
%D 2001
%J Economic Theory
%K networks game-theory coevolution
%N 1
%P 101--120
%R 10.1007/PL00004094
%T Conformism and diversity under social learning
%V 17
%X When there are competing technologies or products with unknown payoffs an important question is which technology will prevail and whether technologies with different payoffs can coexist in the long run. In this paper, we use a social learning model with local interactions to study this question. We show that the adoption of technologies as well as the prospects of conformism/diversity depend crucially on the nature of interaction between individuals and the heterogeneity of preferences in a society.
@article{Bala2001,
abstract = {When there are competing technologies or products with unknown payoffs an important question is which technology will prevail and whether technologies with different payoffs can coexist in the long run. In this paper, we use a social learning model with local interactions to study this question. We show that the adoption of technologies as well as the prospects of conformism/diversity depend crucially on the nature of interaction between individuals and the heterogeneity of preferences in a society.},
added-at = {2011-01-13T13:25:31.000+0100},
author = {Bala, Venkatesh and Goyal, Sanjeev},
biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/24d8d769480d1c538738209481bd6208f/rincedd},
doi = {10.1007/PL00004094},
file = {Bala2001 - Conformism and diversity under social learning.pdf:Evolutionary Game Theory/Bala2001 - Conformism and diversity under social learning.pdf:PDF},
groups = {public},
interhash = {e38499ada16ada63790d8a158ed6b793},
intrahash = {4d8d769480d1c538738209481bd6208f},
journal = {Economic Theory},
keywords = {networks game-theory coevolution},
number = 1,
pages = {101--120},
timestamp = {2011-03-30T16:38:20.000+0200},
title = {Conformism and diversity under social learning},
username = {rincedd},
volume = 17,
year = 2001
}