Co-evolutionary Strategies for an Alternating-Offer
Bargaining Problem
N. Jin, and E. Tsang. IEEE 2005 Symposium on Computational Intelligence and
Games CIG'05, page 211--217. Essex, UK, IEEE Press, (4-6 April 2005)
Abstract
We apply an Evolutionary Algorithm (EA) to solve the
Rubinstein's Basic Alternating-Offer Bargaining
Problem, and compare our experimental results with its
analytic game-theoretic solution. The application of EA
employs an alternative set of assumptions on the
players' behaviours. Experimental outcomes suggest that
the applied co-evolutionary algorithm, one of
Evolutionary Algorithms, is able to generate convincing
approximations of the theoretic solutions. The major
advantages of EA over the game-theoretic analysis are
its flexibility and ease of application to variants of
Rubinstein Bargaining Problems and complicated
bargaining situations for which theoretic solutions are
unavailable.
%0 Conference Paper
%1 Jin:2005:CIG
%A Jin, Nanlin
%A Tsang, Edward
%B IEEE 2005 Symposium on Computational Intelligence and
Games CIG'05
%C Essex, UK
%D 2005
%E Kendall, Graham
%E Lucas, Simon
%I IEEE Press
%K Bargaining Co-evolution, GP, Theory algorithms, genetic programming,
%P 211--217
%T Co-evolutionary Strategies for an Alternating-Offer
Bargaining Problem
%U http://cswww.essex.ac.uk/Research/CSP/finance/papers/JinTsa-Bargaining-Cig2005.pdf
%X We apply an Evolutionary Algorithm (EA) to solve the
Rubinstein's Basic Alternating-Offer Bargaining
Problem, and compare our experimental results with its
analytic game-theoretic solution. The application of EA
employs an alternative set of assumptions on the
players' behaviours. Experimental outcomes suggest that
the applied co-evolutionary algorithm, one of
Evolutionary Algorithms, is able to generate convincing
approximations of the theoretic solutions. The major
advantages of EA over the game-theoretic analysis are
its flexibility and ease of application to variants of
Rubinstein Bargaining Problems and complicated
bargaining situations for which theoretic solutions are
unavailable.
@inproceedings{Jin:2005:CIG,
abstract = {We apply an Evolutionary Algorithm (EA) to solve the
Rubinstein's Basic Alternating-Offer Bargaining
Problem, and compare our experimental results with its
analytic game-theoretic solution. The application of EA
employs an alternative set of assumptions on the
players' behaviours. Experimental outcomes suggest that
the applied co-evolutionary algorithm, one of
Evolutionary Algorithms, is able to generate convincing
approximations of the theoretic solutions. The major
advantages of EA over the game-theoretic analysis are
its flexibility and ease of application to variants of
Rubinstein Bargaining Problems and complicated
bargaining situations for which theoretic solutions are
unavailable.},
added-at = {2008-06-19T17:35:00.000+0200},
address = {Essex, UK},
author = {Jin, Nanlin and Tsang, Edward},
biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/27f89bc0ec54350c5eb2e54ce2e4402bf/brazovayeye},
booktitle = {IEEE 2005 Symposium on Computational Intelligence and
Games CIG'05},
editor = {Kendall, Graham and Lucas, Simon},
email = {njin@essex.ac.uk, edward@essex.ac.uk},
interhash = {fd080c5d62bde2452c5418da9f96b331},
intrahash = {7f89bc0ec54350c5eb2e54ce2e4402bf},
keywords = {Bargaining Co-evolution, GP, Theory algorithms, genetic programming,},
month = {4-6 April},
organisation = {Computational Intelligence Society},
pages = {211--217},
publisher = {IEEE Press},
size = {7 pages},
timestamp = {2008-06-19T17:42:26.000+0200},
title = {Co-evolutionary Strategies for an Alternating-Offer
Bargaining Problem},
url = {http://cswww.essex.ac.uk/Research/CSP/finance/papers/JinTsa-Bargaining-Cig2005.pdf},
year = 2005
}