Abstract
We document the effects of group affiliation on the initial performance
of 2,713 initial public offerings (IPOs) in India under three regulatory
regimes during the period 1990-2004. We distinguish between two competing
hypotheses regarding group affiliation: the "certification" and the
"tunneling" hypotheses. We lend support to the latter by showing
that the underpricing of business group companies is higher than
that of stand-alone companies. Furthermore, we find that the long-run
performance of IPOs, in general, is negative. We also find that Indian
investors over-react to IPOs and their over-reaction (proxied by
the oversubscription rate) explains the extent of underpricing. ©
2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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