%0 Journal Article %1 beramendi2016gives %A Beramendi, Pablo %A Rehm, Philipp %D 2016 %J Comparative Political Studies %K 2016 ALLBUS ALLBUS_input2016 ALLBUS_version31 ALLBUSkum1980-2010 FDZ_ALLBUS FDZ_IUP ISSP ISSP_input2016 SCOPUSindexed SSCIindexed article checked english gt indexproved input2016 isspbib2016 review_proved reviewed %N 4 %P 529-563 %R 10.1177/0010414015617961 %T Who Gives, Who Gains? Progressivity and Preferences %U http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414015617961 %V 49 %X The extent to which popular support for the welfare state depends on income varies greatly across nations and policy domains. We argue and show formally that these variations—largely overlooked yet essential to understanding the politics of redistribution—reflect in part the design of tax and transfer policies in terms of progressivity. When progressivity is high, politics is perceived by income groups as a zero sum game and conflicts over who gets what intensify. When progressivity is low, and tax contributors and benefit recipients overlap, redistributive struggles become politically less salient. We test these predictions both across nations and across policy domains within a sample of advanced industrial democracies. Our findings indicate that the progressivity of the tax and transfer system is a major determinant of the predictive power of income on preferences for redistribution.

@article{beramendi2016gives, abstract = {The extent to which popular support for the welfare state depends on income varies greatly across nations and policy domains. We argue and show formally that these variations—largely overlooked yet essential to understanding the politics of redistribution—reflect in part the design of tax and transfer policies in terms of progressivity. When progressivity is high, politics is perceived by income groups as a zero sum game and conflicts over who gets what intensify. When progressivity is low, and tax contributors and benefit recipients overlap, redistributive struggles become politically less salient. We test these predictions both across nations and across policy domains within a sample of advanced industrial democracies. Our findings indicate that the progressivity of the tax and transfer system is a major determinant of the predictive power of income on preferences for redistribution.}, added-at = {2019-03-20T18:49:19.000+0100}, author = {Beramendi, Pablo and Rehm, Philipp}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/24e8825a5bccfb0431689861d292a81ce/gesis_dump}, doi = {10.1177/0010414015617961}, interhash = {f0eda32653b245c7d3039e182bcfa3c7}, intrahash = {4e8825a5bccfb0431689861d292a81ce}, journal = {Comparative Political Studies }, keywords = {2016 ALLBUS ALLBUS_input2016 ALLBUS_version31 ALLBUSkum1980-2010 FDZ_ALLBUS FDZ_IUP ISSP ISSP_input2016 SCOPUSindexed SSCIindexed article checked english gt indexproved input2016 isspbib2016 review_proved reviewed}, language = {english}, note = {First published online: December 28, 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414015617961. (ISSP) (ALLBUS) }, number = 4, pages = {529-563}, study = {ISSP2006}, tagadata-svko-dda-test = {11029}, tagadata-svkoddatest2 = {11022}, timestamp = {2019-10-01T13:01:44.000+0200}, title = {Who Gives, Who Gains? Progressivity and Preferences}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414015617961}, volume = 49, year = 2016 }