Article,
Advances in Dynamic Games, Games of Conflict, Evolutionary Games, Economic Games, and Games Involving Common Interest
Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, (2020)
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-56534-3\_8
Abstract
Spatial dynamics can promote the evolution of cooperation. While dispersal processes have been studied in simple evolutionary games, real-world social dilemmas are much more complicated. When the investment is low, for example, every additional unit of investment may substantially raise the public goods. However, the effect vanishes as the number of investments increases. Such nonlinear public goods are the norm in a variety of social as well as biological systems. Therefore, we investigate the effect of the nonlinearity on the evolution of cooperation. We show how the nonlinearity in payoffs, resulting in synergy or discounting of public goods, can alter the return on the cooperative investments compared to the linear game. The alteration affects the resulting spatial patterns, not just quantitatively, but in some cases, drastically changing the outcomes. Notably, in cases where a linear game would lead to extinction, synergy can support the coexistence of cooperators and defectors. The eco-evolutionary trajectory can thus be qualitatively different in cases on nonlinear social dilemmas.
