Abstract
In July 1969 the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Antitrust Subcommittee met to reconvene its hearings on conglomerate corporations. The guests that day were the top executives at Gulf & Western Industries, a company that, just over a decade earlier, had been a middling auto parts manufacturer with $8 million in total sales. Eleven years, 127 mergers, and two name changes later, Gulf & Western had morphed into a sprawling empire with a cornucopia of products—from paint pigment and traffic lights to soul records and cigars—amounting to more than $1.3 billion in annual sales. Speaking on behalf of the firm, the Gulf & Western president David Judelson framed his opening statement with a series of rhetorical questions: “What is Gulf \& Western? Who is Gulf \& Western? How and why has Gulf \& Western developed?” His response was that the firm represented something altogether new in American life: a corporation that made diversification—the act of branching out into many unrelated fields—its foundational premise. True, this process required an aggressive acquisitions stance, but the end result was something of value: “a federation of small-, medium-, and large-sized corporations.” After hours of testimony, the subcommittee chair Emanuel Celler remained unconvinced. “Are you familiar with Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart's opera Don Giovanni,” he asked the Gulf \& Western chief executive Charles Bluhdorn. The Viennese émigré was not, but he quipped that perhaps Paramount Pictures, a Gulf \& Western subsidiary, could make a film version. Unamused, Celler described a scene in which Giovanni's servant was asked how many mistresses the legendary Lothario kept; the servant responded by producing a chronicle that, when unfurled, spanned the entire stage. “I cannot help but make a comparison,” the chairman deadpanned, “between your Gulf & Western and Don Giovanni.”
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