Article,

Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games

, and .
Games and Economic Behavior, 10 (1): 6--38 (July 1995)

Abstract

We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting. Players choose strategies based on relative expected utility and assume other players do so as well. We define a quantal response equilibrium (ORE) as a fixed point of this process and establish existence. For a logit specification of the error structure, we show that as the error goes to zero, QRE approaches a subset of Nash equilibria and also implies a unique selection from the set of Nash equilibria in generic games. We fit the model to a variety of experimental data sets by using maximum likelihood estimation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C19, C44, C72, C92.

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