%0 Journal Article %1 Zimmermann2000 %A Zimmermann, Martín G. %A Eguíluz, Víctor M. %A San Miguel, Maxi %A Spadaro, A. %D 2000 %J Adv. Complex Syst. %K prisoners-dilemma networks game-theory coevolution oscillations leadership adaptive-networks bistability graphs %P 283 %R 10.1142/S0219525900000212 %T Cooperation in an Adaptive Network %V 3 %X We study the dynamics of a set of agents distributed in the nodes of an adaptive network. Each agent plays with all its neighbors a weak prisoner's dilemma collecting a total payoff. We study the case where the network adapts locally depending on the total payoff of the agents. In the parameter regime considered, a steady state is always reached (strategies and network configuration remain stationary), where co-operation is highly enhanced. However, when the adaptability of the network and the incentive for defection are high enough, we show that a slight perturbation of the steady state induces large oscillations (with cascades) in behavior between the nearly all-defectors state and the all-cooperators outcome.

@article{Zimmermann2000, abstract = {We study the dynamics of a set of agents distributed in the nodes of an adaptive network. Each agent plays with all its neighbors a weak prisoner's dilemma collecting a total payoff. We study the case where the network adapts locally depending on the total payoff of the agents. In the parameter regime considered, a steady state is always reached (strategies and network configuration remain stationary), where co-operation is highly enhanced. However, when the adaptability of the network and the incentive for defection are high enough, we show that a slight perturbation of the steady state induces large oscillations (with cascades) in behavior between the nearly all-defectors state and the all-cooperators outcome.}, added-at = {2011-01-13T13:26:45.000+0100}, author = {Zimmermann, Martín G. and Eguíluz, Víctor M. and {San Miguel}, Maxi and Spadaro, A.}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/21c196b90d90a345722cf3bc056405c5b/rincedd}, doi = {10.1142/S0219525900000212}, file = {Zimmermann2000 - Cooperation in an adaptive network.pdf:Evolutionary Game Theory/Zimmermann2000 - Cooperation in an adaptive network.pdf:PDF}, interhash = {7449385d847133aa5589c86d12dafaba}, intrahash = {1c196b90d90a345722cf3bc056405c5b}, journal = {Adv. Complex Syst.}, keywords = {prisoners-dilemma networks game-theory coevolution oscillations leadership adaptive-networks bistability graphs}, pages = 283, review = {* weak PD * synchronous updating * imitate best neighbor * on imitation of D, rewire away with probability p; i.e. only Ds rewire * always reaches stationary state: absorbing all-D or frozen high-C or high-D state * frozen state: hierarchical imitation network, leadership of high-degree nodes * largest-payoff-node is satisfied cooperator (top of imitiation network) * transient oscillations/avalanches}, timestamp = {2011-01-13T13:26:45.000+0100}, title = {Cooperation in an Adaptive Network}, volume = 3, year = 2000 }