%0 Journal Article %1 Kandori1993 %A Kandori, Michihiro %A Mailath, George J. %A Rob, Rafael %D 1993 %J Ecta %K chains, risk Evolutionary Markov dominance, selection Equilibrium strict Game learning, theory, rationality, %N 1 %P 29--56 %T Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games %V 61 %X We analyze an evolutionary model with a finite number of players and with noise or mutations. The expansion and contraction of strategies is linked--as usual--to their current relative success, but mutations--which perturb the system away from its deterministic evolution--are present as well. Mutations can occur in every period, so the focus is on the implications of ongoing mutations, not a one-shot mutation. The effect of these mutations is to drastically reduce the set of equilibria to what we term "long-run equilibria." For $2 \times 2$ symmetric games with two symmetric strict Nash equilibria the equilibrium selected satisfies (for large populations) Harsanyi and Selten's (1988) criterion of risk-dominance. In particular, if both strategies have equal security levels, the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium is selected, even though there is another strict Nash equilibrium.

@article{Kandori1993, abstract = {We analyze an evolutionary model with a finite number of players and with noise or mutations. The expansion and contraction of strategies is linked--as usual--to their current relative success, but mutations--which perturb the system away from its deterministic evolution--are present as well. Mutations can occur in every period, so the focus is on the implications of ongoing mutations, not a one-shot mutation. The effect of these mutations is to drastically reduce the set of equilibria to what we term "long-run equilibria." For $2 \times 2$ symmetric games with two symmetric strict Nash equilibria the equilibrium selected satisfies (for large populations) Harsanyi and Selten's (1988) criterion of risk-dominance. In particular, if both strategies have equal security levels, the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium is selected, even though there is another strict Nash equilibrium.}, added-at = {2006-09-29T17:08:21.000+0200}, author = {Kandori, Michihiro and Mailath, George J. and Rob, Rafael}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/22fe443bb73c5a1e7aa6f76bf1b0806cd/gerhard}, copyright = {Copyright 1993 The Econometric Society}, interhash = {e7a7dbd92c8ad44b012ecbac00a39135}, intrahash = {2fe443bb73c5a1e7aa6f76bf1b0806cd}, issn = {00129682}, journal = {Ecta}, keywords = {chains, risk Evolutionary Markov dominance, selection Equilibrium strict Game learning, theory, rationality,}, month = {Jan.}, number = 1, owner = {Gerhard}, pages = {29--56}, pdf = {papers\Kandori1993.pdf}, timestamp = {2006-09-29T17:08:21.000+0200}, title = {Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games}, volume = 61, year = 1993 }