What is the relation between knowledge and action? According to one standard picture,
there is none. Rational action is a matter of maximizing expected utility, where expected
utility is a function of utility and subjective credence. It is subjective degrees of belief
that matter for rational action, not knowledge. On this picture, having knowledge that p is
independent of whether it is rational to act on one’s belief that p: knowledge that p is not
sufficient since one may know that p despite lacking sufficiently high subjective credence
to warrant acting on the proposition that p; and knowledge that p is not necessary, since
high subjective credence can rationalize action even in the absence of knowledge.
%0 Journal Article
%1 hawthorne2008knowledge
%A Hawthorne, John
%A Stanley, Jason
%D 2008
%J Journal of Philosophy
%K action design epistemology knowledge philosophy
%N 10
%P 571-590
%T Knowledge and action
%U http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~jasoncs/knowledgeactionfinal.pdf
%V 105
%X What is the relation between knowledge and action? According to one standard picture,
there is none. Rational action is a matter of maximizing expected utility, where expected
utility is a function of utility and subjective credence. It is subjective degrees of belief
that matter for rational action, not knowledge. On this picture, having knowledge that p is
independent of whether it is rational to act on one’s belief that p: knowledge that p is not
sufficient since one may know that p despite lacking sufficiently high subjective credence
to warrant acting on the proposition that p; and knowledge that p is not necessary, since
high subjective credence can rationalize action even in the absence of knowledge.
@article{hawthorne2008knowledge,
abstract = {What is the relation between knowledge and action? According to one standard picture,
there is none. Rational action is a matter of maximizing expected utility, where expected
utility is a function of utility and subjective credence. It is subjective degrees of belief
that matter for rational action, not knowledge. On this picture, having knowledge that p is
independent of whether it is rational to act on one’s belief that p: knowledge that p is not
sufficient since one may know that p despite lacking sufficiently high subjective credence
to warrant acting on the proposition that p; and knowledge that p is not necessary, since
high subjective credence can rationalize action even in the absence of knowledge.},
added-at = {2009-10-27T13:00:49.000+0100},
author = {Hawthorne, John and Stanley, Jason},
biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2578f8a28786c2291bf33825da7b65661/yish},
interhash = {e88c80a300d1c6013f155b3b43f63f34},
intrahash = {578f8a28786c2291bf33825da7b65661},
journal = {Journal of Philosophy},
keywords = {action design epistemology knowledge philosophy},
number = 10,
pages = {571-590},
timestamp = {2009-10-27T13:00:49.000+0100},
title = {Knowledge and action},
url = {http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~jasoncs/knowledgeactionfinal.pdf},
volume = 105,
year = 2008
}