We study a condition of favoring cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma game on complex networks. There are two kinds of players: cooperators and defectors. Cooperators pay a benefit b to their neighbors at a cost c, whereas defectors only receive a benefit. The game is a death–birth process with weak selection. Although it has been widely thought that b/c>k is a condition of favoring cooperation (Ohtsuki et al., 2006), we find that b/c>knn is the condition. We also show that among three representative networks, namely, regular, random, and scale-free, a regular network favors cooperation the most, whereas a scale-free network favors cooperation the least. In an ideal scale-free network, cooperation is never realized. Whether or not the scale-free network and network heterogeneity favor cooperation depends on the details of the game, although it is occasionally believed that these favor cooperation irrespective of the game structure.
Konno2011 - A condition for cooperation in a game on complex networks.pdf:Evolutionary Game Theory/Konno2011 - A condition for cooperation in a game on complex networks.pdf:PDF
%0 Journal Article
%1 Konno2011
%A Konno, Tomohiko
%D 2011
%J J. Theor. Biol.
%K cooperation evolution game-theory graphs networks prisoners-dilemma
%N 1
%P 224--233
%R 10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.10.033
%T A condition for cooperation in a game on complex networks
%V 269
%X We study a condition of favoring cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma game on complex networks. There are two kinds of players: cooperators and defectors. Cooperators pay a benefit b to their neighbors at a cost c, whereas defectors only receive a benefit. The game is a death–birth process with weak selection. Although it has been widely thought that b/c>k is a condition of favoring cooperation (Ohtsuki et al., 2006), we find that b/c>knn is the condition. We also show that among three representative networks, namely, regular, random, and scale-free, a regular network favors cooperation the most, whereas a scale-free network favors cooperation the least. In an ideal scale-free network, cooperation is never realized. Whether or not the scale-free network and network heterogeneity favor cooperation depends on the details of the game, although it is occasionally believed that these favor cooperation irrespective of the game structure.
@article{Konno2011,
abstract = {We study a condition of favoring cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma game on complex networks. There are two kinds of players: cooperators and defectors. Cooperators pay a benefit b to their neighbors at a cost c, whereas defectors only receive a benefit. The game is a death–birth process with weak selection. Although it has been widely thought that b/c>k is a condition of favoring cooperation (Ohtsuki et al., 2006), we find that b/c>knn is the condition. We also show that among three representative networks, namely, regular, random, and scale-free, a regular network favors cooperation the most, whereas a scale-free network favors cooperation the least. In an ideal scale-free network, cooperation is never realized. Whether or not the scale-free network and network heterogeneity favor cooperation depends on the details of the game, although it is occasionally believed that these favor cooperation irrespective of the game structure.},
added-at = {2011-04-12T15:20:04.000+0200},
author = {Konno, Tomohiko},
biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/26f50d1d93a5df2fcc2aeedd0d2e17a41/rincedd},
doi = {10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.10.033},
file = {Konno2011 - A condition for cooperation in a game on complex networks.pdf:Evolutionary Game Theory/Konno2011 - A condition for cooperation in a game on complex networks.pdf:PDF},
groups = {public},
interhash = {eb6ba74e8cfccb8c8d869014aadbf930},
intrahash = {c4eeb40cd4665e1047f7a0441aab100d},
journal = {J. Theor. Biol.},
keywords = {cooperation evolution game-theory graphs networks prisoners-dilemma},
number = 1,
pages = {224--233},
timestamp = {2011-04-12T15:21:18.000+0200},
title = {A condition for cooperation in a game on complex networks},
username = {rincedd},
volume = 269,
year = 2011
}