Zusammenfassung
Most commanders, politicians and intelligence agents have at least
an intuitive understanding of hierarchies and how to affect their
behavior. However, covert organizations, such as terrorist organizations,
have network structures that are distinct from those in typical
hierarchical organizations. In particular, they tend to be more
cellular and distributed. This makes it difficult to apply the lessons
of experience in determining how best to destabilize these groups.
This problem is further compounded by the vast quantities of, yet
incomplete, information. What is needed is a set of tools and an
approach to assessing destabilization strategies that takes these
difficulties in to account and provides analysts with guidance in
assessing destabilization tactics. Such an approach is forwarded
in this paper. In addition, initial lessons learned are discussed.
The particular approach is extensible and scales well to groups
composed of 1000’s of members.
Nutzer