Images of Artificial Intelligence: a Blind Spot in AI Ethics
Philosophy & Technology, 35 (1):
4 (Jan 29, 2022)DOI: 10.1007/s13347-022-00498-3
Abstract
This paper argues that the AI ethics has generally neglected the issues related to the science communication of AI. In particular, the article focuses on visual communication about AI and, more specifically, on the use of certain stock images in science communication about AI --- in particular, those characterized by an excessive use of blue color and recurrent subjects, such as androgyne faces, half-flesh and half-circuit brains, and variations on Michelangelo's The Creation of Adam. In the first section, the author refers to a ``referentialist'' ethics of science communication for an ethical assessment of these images. From this perspective, these images are unethical. While the ethics of science communication generally promotes virtues like modesty and humility, similar images are arrogant and overconfident. In the second section, the author uses French philosopher Jacques Rancière's concepts of ``distribution of the sensible,'' ``disagreement,'' and ``pensive image.'' Rancière's thought paves the way to a deeper critique of these images of AI. The problem with similar images is not their lack of reference to the ``things themselves.'' It rather lies in the way they stifle any possible forms of disagreement about AI. However, the author argues that stock images and other popular images of AI are not a problem per se, and they can also be a resource. This depends on the real possibility for these images to support forms of pensiveness. In the conclusion, the question is asked whether the kind of ethics or politics of AI images proposed in this article can be applied to AI ethics tout court.