Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge and Chosen Ciphertext Attack
C. Rackoff, and D. Simon. Advances in Cryptology --- CRYPTO '91, page 433--444. Berlin, Heidelberg, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, (1992)
Abstract
The zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, first defined by Fiat, Fiege and Shamir, was used by Galil, Haber and Yung as a means of constructing (out of a trapdoor function) an interactive public-key cryptosystem provably secure against chosen ciphertext attack. We introduce a revised setting which permits the definition of a non-interactive analogue, the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, and show how it may be constructed in that setting from a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system for N P (of the type introduced by Blum, Feldman and Micali). We give a formalization of chosen ciphertext attack in our model which is stronger than the ``lunchtime attack'' considered by Naor and Yung, and prove a non-interactive public-key cryptosystem based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge to be secure against it.
Description
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge and Chosen Ciphertext Attack | SpringerLink
%0 Conference Paper
%1 10.1007/3-540-46766-1_35
%A Rackoff, Charles
%A Simon, Daniel R.
%B Advances in Cryptology --- CRYPTO '91
%C Berlin, Heidelberg
%D 1992
%E Feigenbaum, Joan
%I Springer Berlin Heidelberg
%K CCA NIZKP cryptography
%P 433--444
%T Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge and Chosen Ciphertext Attack
%X The zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, first defined by Fiat, Fiege and Shamir, was used by Galil, Haber and Yung as a means of constructing (out of a trapdoor function) an interactive public-key cryptosystem provably secure against chosen ciphertext attack. We introduce a revised setting which permits the definition of a non-interactive analogue, the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, and show how it may be constructed in that setting from a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system for N P (of the type introduced by Blum, Feldman and Micali). We give a formalization of chosen ciphertext attack in our model which is stronger than the ``lunchtime attack'' considered by Naor and Yung, and prove a non-interactive public-key cryptosystem based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge to be secure against it.
%@ 978-3-540-46766-3
@inproceedings{10.1007/3-540-46766-1_35,
abstract = {The zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, first defined by Fiat, Fiege and Shamir, was used by Galil, Haber and Yung as a means of constructing (out of a trapdoor function) an interactive public-key cryptosystem provably secure against chosen ciphertext attack. We introduce a revised setting which permits the definition of a non-interactive analogue, the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, and show how it may be constructed in that setting from a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system for N P (of the type introduced by Blum, Feldman and Micali). We give a formalization of chosen ciphertext attack in our model which is stronger than the ``lunchtime attack'' considered by Naor and Yung, and prove a non-interactive public-key cryptosystem based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge to be secure against it.},
added-at = {2019-08-23T07:44:53.000+0200},
address = {Berlin, Heidelberg},
author = {Rackoff, Charles and Simon, Daniel R.},
biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/29d68012ecae6890824d1ba5450147340/ndbunner},
booktitle = {Advances in Cryptology --- CRYPTO '91},
description = {Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge and Chosen Ciphertext Attack | SpringerLink},
editor = {Feigenbaum, Joan},
interhash = {72aca83550f66035e50acd1646901326},
intrahash = {9d68012ecae6890824d1ba5450147340},
isbn = {978-3-540-46766-3},
keywords = {CCA NIZKP cryptography},
pages = {433--444},
publisher = {Springer Berlin Heidelberg},
timestamp = {2019-08-23T07:44:53.000+0200},
title = {Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge and Chosen Ciphertext Attack},
year = 1992
}