The paper studies information markets about single events from an epistemic
social choice perspective. Within the classical Condorcet error model for
collective binary decisions, we establish equivalence results between elections
and markets, showing that the alternative that would be selected by weighed
majority voting (under specific weighting schemes) corresponds to the
alternative with highest price in the equilibrium of the market (under specific
assumptions on the market type). This makes it possible to implement specific
weighted majority elections, which are known to have superior truth-tracking
performance, through information markets and, crucially, without needing to
elicit voters' competences.
%0 Generic
%1 airiau2023condorcet
%A Airiau, Stéphane
%A Dupuis, Nicholas Kees
%A Grossi, Davide
%D 2023
%K marketing phd
%T Condorcet Markets
%U http://arxiv.org/abs/2306.05028
%X The paper studies information markets about single events from an epistemic
social choice perspective. Within the classical Condorcet error model for
collective binary decisions, we establish equivalence results between elections
and markets, showing that the alternative that would be selected by weighed
majority voting (under specific weighting schemes) corresponds to the
alternative with highest price in the equilibrium of the market (under specific
assumptions on the market type). This makes it possible to implement specific
weighted majority elections, which are known to have superior truth-tracking
performance, through information markets and, crucially, without needing to
elicit voters' competences.
@misc{airiau2023condorcet,
abstract = {The paper studies information markets about single events from an epistemic
social choice perspective. Within the classical Condorcet error model for
collective binary decisions, we establish equivalence results between elections
and markets, showing that the alternative that would be selected by weighed
majority voting (under specific weighting schemes) corresponds to the
alternative with highest price in the equilibrium of the market (under specific
assumptions on the market type). This makes it possible to implement specific
weighted majority elections, which are known to have superior truth-tracking
performance, through information markets and, crucially, without needing to
elicit voters' competences.},
added-at = {2023-06-11T21:27:17.000+0200},
author = {Airiau, Stéphane and Dupuis, Nicholas Kees and Grossi, Davide},
biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2ea7882dd2c299bd31a1e9f082c27f21f/yassinegh},
interhash = {089a6d62995719fd7ad9fbb17bc92a80},
intrahash = {ea7882dd2c299bd31a1e9f082c27f21f},
keywords = {marketing phd},
note = {cite arxiv:2306.05028},
timestamp = {2023-06-11T21:27:17.000+0200},
title = {Condorcet Markets},
url = {http://arxiv.org/abs/2306.05028},
year = 2023
}