Аннотация
Models of cooperation grounded on social networks and on the ability of
individuals to choose actions and partners aim to describe human social
behavior. Extensive computer simulations of these models give important insight
in the social mechanisms behind emerging collective behavior. We consider the
entangled co-evolution of actions and social structure in a new version of a
spatial Prisoner's Dilemma model that naturally gives way to a process of
social differentiation. Diverse social roles emerge from the dynamics of the
system: leaders -individuals getting a large payoff who are imitated by a
considerable fraction of the population-, conformists -unsatisfied cooperative
agents that keep cooperating-, and exploiters -Defectors with a payoff larger
than the average one obtained by Cooperators. The dynamics generates a social
network that can have the topology of a small world network. The network has a
strong hierarchical structure in which the leaders play an essential role
sustaining a highly cooperative stable regime. The social structure is shown to
be very sensitive to perturbations acting on the leaders. Such perturbations
produce social crisis described as dynamical cascades that propagate through
the network.
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