Techreport,
Co-evolution of auction mechanisms and strategies: Towards a novel approach to microeconomic design
ULCS-02-004. Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, UK, (2002)
Abstract
Mechanism design is the economic theory of the design
of effective resource allocation mechanisms, such as
auctions. Traditionally, economists have approached
design problems by studying the analytic properties of
different mechanisms. An alternative is to view a
mechanism as the outcome of some evolutionary process
involving buyers, sellers and the auctioneer. As a
first step in this alternative direction, we have
applied genetic programming to the development of an
auction pricing rule for double auctions in a wholesale
electricity marketplace. For this purpose we adopted
the multi-agent simulation model of Nicolaisen, Petrov
and Tesfatsion.
Tags
- (mas),
- algorithms,
- allocation,
- auction
- computation,
- design,
- evolutionary
- genetic
- market
- mechanisms,
- multi-agent
- programming,
- resource
- strategies
- systems
- trading
