Аннотация
Dissatisfaction with previous assignment mechanisms and the
desire to raise revenue induced Congress to grant the FCC
authority to auction radio licencses. Among other things,
synergies among license valuations complicate the auction design
process. Theory suggests that a "simple" (i.e.,
non-combinatorial) auction will have difficulty in assigning
licneses efficiently in such an environment. This difficulty
increases with increases in "fitting complexity." In some
environments, bidding may become "mutually destructive."
Experiements indicate that a combinatorial auction is superior to
a simple auction in terms of economic efficiency and revenue
generation in bidding environments with a low amount of fitting
complexity. Concerns that a combinatorial auction will cause a
"threshold" problem appear overblown when bidders for small
packages can communicate.
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