%0 Journal Article %1 agamben2002time %A Agamben, Giorgio %D 2002 %J Epoché %K eschatology philosophy time %N 1 %P 1–14 %R 10.5840/EPOCHE2002714 %T The time that is left %U https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-Time-that-Is-Left-Agamben/48586aac67596f441d63b26f69ecfa0e052af945 %V 7 %X Let me start with a question. As you know, Paul in his letters refers to himself as an apostle. Why apostle and not, for instance, prophet? What is the difference between the apostle and the prophet? To grasp this difference will mean to understand concretely the problem of messianic time. You certainly remember the importance of the prophet, the nabi, in Judaism and, generally, in ancient cultures. But no less important is the legacy of the posterity of this figure in our culture up to modernity. For instance, Aby Warburg used to classify Jakob Bruckhardt and Nietzsche as two opposite types of nab;: the first turned backward to the past and the second turned toward the future. And I remember that in his lesson at the College International de philosophie of February 1, 1984, Michel Foucault distinguished four types of "veridiction" or truth-saying: the prophet, the wise, the technician, and the Pharisee; and, in the ensuing lecture, he traced the posterity of these four figures in the history of philosophy. It is an interesting exercise, and I suggest you try it! What is a prophet? It is, first of all, a man who is in immediate relationship with the ruah /ahwe, the spirit of God, from whom he receives a word that does not belong to himself. "Thus speaks Yahweh" is the formula that opens prophetic discourse. As a spokesperson of God, the nabi is clearly distinct from the apostle, who-being an emissary for a particular concern-must accomplish his work with lucidity and find himself the words of his announcement, which in his case Paul can thus define as "my gospel, my announcement" (Rom. 2: 16).1 In Judaism, prophecy is not an institution whose function and place could be clearly defined. It is, rather, something like a force or tension constantly struggling with other forces, which try to enclose it within fixed boundaries both in space and in time. Thus the rabbinic tradition tends to close the legitimacy of prophecy with the first destruction of the temple, in 587 B.C. To this closure of prophecy-so to say from outside-another limitation.

@article{agamben2002time, abstract = {Let me start with a question. As you know, Paul in his letters refers to himself as an apostle. Why apostle and not, for instance, prophet? What is the difference between the apostle and the prophet? To grasp this difference will mean to understand concretely the problem of messianic time. You certainly remember the importance of the prophet, the nabi, in Judaism and, generally, in ancient cultures. But no less important is the legacy of the posterity of this figure in our culture up to modernity. For instance, Aby Warburg used to classify Jakob Bruckhardt and Nietzsche as two opposite types of nab;: the first turned backward to the past and the second turned toward the future. And I remember that in his lesson at the College International de philosophie of February 1, 1984, Michel Foucault distinguished four types of "veridiction" or truth-saying: the prophet, the wise, the technician, and the Pharisee; and, in the ensuing lecture, he traced the posterity of these four figures in the history of philosophy. It is an interesting exercise, and I suggest you try it! What is a prophet? It is, first of all, a man who is in immediate relationship with the ruah /ahwe, the spirit of God, from whom he receives a word that does not belong to himself. "Thus speaks Yahweh" is the formula that opens prophetic discourse. As a spokesperson of God, the nabi is clearly distinct from the apostle, who-being an emissary for a particular concern-must accomplish his work with lucidity and find himself the words of his announcement, which in his case Paul can thus define as "my gospel, my announcement" (Rom. 2: 16).1 In Judaism, prophecy is not an institution whose function and place could be clearly defined. It is, rather, something like a force or tension constantly struggling with other forces, which try to enclose it within fixed boundaries both in space and in time. Thus the rabbinic tradition tends to close the legitimacy of prophecy with the first destruction of the temple, in 587 B.C. To this closure of prophecy-so to say from outside-another limitation. }, added-at = {2011-09-04T19:05:16.000+0200}, author = {Agamben, Giorgio}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/288854627212f8235a30355d968b9e5ab/meneteqel}, doi = {10.5840/EPOCHE2002714}, interhash = {c7a6bfb407675b7603132b38835678fa}, intrahash = {88854627212f8235a30355d968b9e5ab}, journal = {Epoché}, keywords = {eschatology philosophy time}, language = {en-UK}, number = 1, pages = {1–14}, timestamp = {2021-10-12T12:33:32.000+0200}, title = {The time that is left}, url = {https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-Time-that-Is-Left-Agamben/48586aac67596f441d63b26f69ecfa0e052af945}, volume = 7, year = 2002 }