We analyze the effect of sponsored data platforms when Internet
service providers (ISPs) compete for subscribers and content
providers (CPs) compete for a share of the bandwidth usage by the
customers. Our analytical model is of a full information,
leader-follower game. ISPs lead and set prices for sponsorship. CPs
then make the binary decision of sponsoring or not sponsoring their
content on the ISPs. Lastly, based on both of these, users make a
two-part decision of choosing the ISP to which they subscribe, and
the amount of data to consume from each of the CPs through the
chosen ISP. User consumption is determined by a utility maximization
framework, the sponsorship decision is determined by a
non-cooperative game between the CPs, and the ISPs set their prices
to maximize their profit in response to the prices set by the
competing ISP. We analyze the pricing dynamics of the prices set by
the ISPs, the sponsorship decisions that the CPs make and the market
structure therein, and the surpluses of the ISPs, CPs, and users.
We show that inter-ISP competition does not inhibit ISPs from
extracting a significant fraction of the CP surplus. Moreover, the
ISPs often have an incentive to significantly skew the CP
marketplace in favor of the most profitable CP.
%0 Conference Paper
%1 vya19ITC31
%A Vyavahare, Pooja
%A Manjunath, D.
%A Nair, J
%B 31th International Teletraffic Congress (ITC 31)
%C Budapest, Hungary
%D 2019
%K itc itc31
%T Sponsored data with ISP competition
%U https://gitlab2.informatik.uni-wuerzburg.de/itc-conference/itc-conference-public/-/raw/master/itc31/vya19ITC31.pdf?inline=true
%X We analyze the effect of sponsored data platforms when Internet
service providers (ISPs) compete for subscribers and content
providers (CPs) compete for a share of the bandwidth usage by the
customers. Our analytical model is of a full information,
leader-follower game. ISPs lead and set prices for sponsorship. CPs
then make the binary decision of sponsoring or not sponsoring their
content on the ISPs. Lastly, based on both of these, users make a
two-part decision of choosing the ISP to which they subscribe, and
the amount of data to consume from each of the CPs through the
chosen ISP. User consumption is determined by a utility maximization
framework, the sponsorship decision is determined by a
non-cooperative game between the CPs, and the ISPs set their prices
to maximize their profit in response to the prices set by the
competing ISP. We analyze the pricing dynamics of the prices set by
the ISPs, the sponsorship decisions that the CPs make and the market
structure therein, and the surpluses of the ISPs, CPs, and users.
We show that inter-ISP competition does not inhibit ISPs from
extracting a significant fraction of the CP surplus. Moreover, the
ISPs often have an incentive to significantly skew the CP
marketplace in favor of the most profitable CP.
@inproceedings{vya19ITC31,
abstract = {We analyze the effect of sponsored data platforms when Internet
service providers (ISPs) compete for subscribers and content
providers (CPs) compete for a share of the bandwidth usage by the
customers. Our analytical model is of a full information,
leader-follower game. ISPs lead and set prices for sponsorship. CPs
then make the binary decision of sponsoring or not sponsoring their
content on the ISPs. Lastly, based on both of these, users make a
two-part decision of choosing the ISP to which they subscribe, and
the amount of data to consume from each of the CPs through the
chosen ISP. User consumption is determined by a utility maximization
framework, the sponsorship decision is determined by a
non-cooperative game between the CPs, and the ISPs set their prices
to maximize their profit in response to the prices set by the
competing ISP. We analyze the pricing dynamics of the prices set by
the ISPs, the sponsorship decisions that the CPs make and the market
structure therein, and the surpluses of the ISPs, CPs, and users.
We show that inter-ISP competition does not inhibit ISPs from
extracting a significant fraction of the CP surplus. Moreover, the
ISPs often have an incentive to significantly skew the CP
marketplace in favor of the most profitable CP.},
added-at = {2020-04-29T15:29:04.000+0200},
address = {Budapest, Hungary},
author = {Vyavahare, Pooja and Manjunath, D. and Nair, J},
biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2d07f0928053767cce2fb47ad1fd6811f/itc},
booktitle = {31th International Teletraffic Congress (ITC 31)},
interhash = {503ceb35d9b1cb2610cc296b7299e8b3},
intrahash = {d07f0928053767cce2fb47ad1fd6811f},
keywords = {itc itc31},
timestamp = {2020-04-30T18:18:45.000+0200},
title = {Sponsored data with ISP competition},
url = {https://gitlab2.informatik.uni-wuerzburg.de/itc-conference/itc-conference-public/-/raw/master/itc31/vya19ITC31.pdf?inline=true},
year = 2019
}