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Другие публикации лиц с тем же именем

Optimal mechanisms for selling information., , и . EC, стр. 92-109. ACM, (2012)Are Two (Samples) Really Better Than One?, , , и . EC, стр. 175. ACM, (2018)Only valuable experts can be valued., , , и . EC, стр. 221-222. ACM, (2011)Mechanism Design with Strategic Mediators., , и . ITCS, стр. 307-316. ACM, (2015)Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation., и . Decis. Support Syst., 39 (1): 123-149 (2005)Incentives and Coordination in Bottleneck Models., и . WINE, том 11316 из Lecture Notes in Computer Science, стр. 37-50. Springer, (2018)On the efficiency of the walrasian mechanism., , , и . EC, стр. 783-800. ACM, (2014)Simplicity in Auctions Revisited: The Primitive Complexity., , и . EC, стр. 153-182. ACM, (2023)Fair Shares: Feasibility, Domination and Incentives., и . EC, стр. 435. ACM, (2022)Making Auctions Robust to Aftermarkets., , , и . ITCS, том 251 из LIPIcs, стр. 9:1-9:23. Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, (2023)