On 1 April 2005, with the implementation of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Disclosure of Donor Information) Regulations 2004, United Kingdom law was changed to allow children born through gamete donation to access details identifying the donor. Drawing on trends in adoption law, the decision to abolish donor anonymity was strongly influenced by a discourse that asserted the ‘child's right to personal identity’. Through examination of the donor anonymity debate in the public realm, while adopting a social constructionist approach, this article discusses how donor anonymity has been defined as a social problem that requires a regulative response. It focuses on the child's ‘right to personal identity’ claims, and discusses the genetic essentialism behind these claims. By basing its assumptions on an adoption analogy, United Kingdom law ascribes a social meaning to the genetic relatedness between gamete donors and the offspring.
On 1 April 2005, with the implementation of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Disclosure of Donor Information) Regulations 2004, United Kingdom law was changed to allow children born through gamete donation to access details identifying the donor. Drawing on trends in adoption law, the decision to abolish donor anonymity was strongly influenced by a discourse that asserted the ‘child's right to personal identity’. Through examination of the donor anonymity debate in the public realm, while adopting a social constructionist approach, this article discusses how donor anonymity has been defined as a social problem that requires a regulative response. It focuses on the child's ‘right to personal identity’ claims, and discusses the genetic essentialism behind these claims. By basing its assumptions on an adoption analogy, United Kingdom law ascribes a social meaning to the genetic relatedness between gamete donors and the offspring
This paper explores cases involving disputes between lesbian parents and known donors with whom informal insemination arrangements were made. It observes that the current legal framework for recognising parents following assisted reproduction is incapable of dealing adequately with known donors, notwithstanding a host of recent developments in the law relating to lesbian parenting. As a result, the case-law exhibits judicial uncertainty and inconsistency about the extent of the recognition to which known donors should be entitled. In spite of the difficulties posed by using known donors, the paper argues that there is a strong case for finding an appropriate way of accommodating them within the legal framework for recognising parents. It explores some of the possible legal responses and highlights their potential advantages and disadvantages from theoretical and practical perspectives.