In this article, I consider whether the advance directive of a person in minimally conscious state ought to be adhered to when its prescriptions conflict with her current wishes. I argue that an advance directive can have moral significance after its issuer has succumbed to minimally conscious state. I also defend the view that the patient can still have a significant degree of autonomy. Consequently, I conclude that her advance directive ought not to be applied. Then I briefly assess whether considerations pertaining to respecting the patient's autonomy could still require obedience to the desire expressed in her advance directive and arrive at a negative answer.
Respect for patient autonomy and the right of individuals to make their own healthcare decisions where possible lies at the core of the recent Mental Capacity Act 2005. The Act gives statutory authority to “Advance Decisions” (ADs) – enabling people to communicate their healthcare decisions in advance of losing the capacity to do so (e.g. due to coma or dementia). This is increasingly important when new medical technologies mean it is now possible keep people alive for years or for decades in permanent vegetative or minimally conscious states (i.e. with no – or virtually no – awareness of themselves or their environment).