A fundamental aspect of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) is the statutory endorsement of a functional approach to capacity. In principle, this requires a separate assessment of capacity in respect of each decision to be made. Most capacity assessments take place at a non-judicial level, and, outside of day-to-day decisions, the most common assessors are likely to be healthcare professionals. This paper investigates the practical operation of the capacity assessment process at both judicial and non-judicial levels. It asks whether the process can deliver on the MCA's goal of preserving maximum decision-making freedom, while, at the same time, providing an appropriate degree of protection. It argues that assessors who are not legally trained encounter signific
Following advance directives in emergencies throws up some complicated problems, as Stephen Bonner and colleagues found. We asked an emergency doctor, a medical defence adviser, and an ethicist what they would do in the circumstances
The landmark decision of Gillick v West Norfolk Area Health Authority was a victory for advocates of adolescent autonomy. It established a test by which the court could measure children's competence with a view to them authorising medical treatment. However, application of the test by clinicians reveals a number of ambiguities which are compounded by subsequent interpretation of Gillick in the law courts. What must be understood by minors in order for them to be deemed competent? At what point in the consent process should competence be assessed? Does competence confer on minors the authority to refuse as well as to accept medical treatment? These are questions which vex clinicians, minors and their families. A growing number of commentators favour application of parts of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 to minors. In this paper, the limitations of this approach are exposed and more radical reform is proposed.