Finally, we calculate the number of physical qubits required to break the 256-bit elliptic curve encryption of keys in the Bitcoin network within the small available time frame in which it would actually pose a threat to do so. It would require 317 × 106 physical qubits to break the encryption within one hour using the surface code, a code cycle time of 1 μs, a reaction time of 10 μs, and a physical gate error of 10-3. To instead break the encryption within one day, it would require 13 × 106 physical qubits.
Governments are back on their anti-encryption bullshit again. Between the U.S. Senate's "EARN IT" Act, the E.U.'s slew of anti-encryption proposals, and Australia's new anti-encryption law, it's become clear that the authoritarians in office view online privacy as a threat to their existence. Normally, when the governments increase their anti-privacy sabre-rattling, technologists start talking more…
SHA-2 (Secure Hash Algorithm 2), of which SHA-256 is a part, is one of the most popular hashing algorithms out there. In this article, we are going to break down each step of the algorithm as simple as we can and work through a real-life example by hand.
Recherchen von ZDF, Washington Post und SRF belegen, dass BND und CIA grobe Menschrechtsverletzungen verschwiegen, als sie heimlich Staaten ausspionierten.
Found linked from Whose Curve Is It Anyway <https://whosecurve.com/>. | Here at Trail of Bits we review a lot of code. From major open source projects to exciting new proprietary software, we’ve seen it all. But one common denominator in all of these systems is that for some inexplicable reason people still seem to think RSA is a good cryptosystem to use. Let me save…
Cryptography engineers have been tearing their hair out over PGP’s deficiencies for (literally) decades. When other kinds of engineers get wind of this, they’re shocked. PGP is bad? Why do people keep telling me to use PGP? The answer is that they shouldn’t be telling you that, because PGP is bad and needs to go away. There are, as you’re about to see, lots of problems with PGP. Fortunately, if you’re not morbidly curious, there’s a simple meta-problem with it: it was designed in the 1990s, before serious modern cryptography.
Here at Trail of Bits we review a lot of code. From major open source projects to exciting new proprietary software, we’ve seen it all. But one common denominator in all of these systems is that for some inexplicable reason people still seem to think RSA is a good cryptosystem to use. Let me save…
Quantum computers pose a significant security threat to cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin. Now a team of Russian scientists has worked out how to secure blockchains using quantum mechanics.
E-Mail-Verschlüsselung ist seit Jahren ein Thema. Und seit Jahren setzt sie sich nicht durch. Das hat verschiedene Gründe. Wir zeigen trotzdem, wie es geht.
S. Fluhrer, I. Mantin, und A. Shamir. SAC '01: Revised Papers from the 8th Annual International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography, Seite 1-24. London, UK, Springer-Verlag, (2001)