In this paper, I discuss several arguments against non-therapeutic mutilation. Interventions into bodily integrity, which do not serve a therapeutic purpose and are not regarded as aesthetically acceptable by the majority, e.g. tongue splitting, branding and flesh stapling, are now practised, but, however, are still seen as a kind of 'aberration' that ought not to be allowed. I reject several arguments for a possible ban on these body modifications. I find the common pathologisation of body modifications, Kant's argument of duties to oneself and the objection from irrationality all wanting. In conclusion, I see no convincing support for prohibition of voluntary mutilations.
One difficulty in dealing with the concept of medical treatment in Canadian criminal law is to reconcile some of the dictates of the Criminal Code, which have ancient origins, with the reality of modern medicine. Such a situation arises when we ask whether a surgical operation is prima facie legal or illegal. This may be considered a rather narrow and esoteric question, but it has and will become increasingly important with the development of modern medical technology. The initial presumption of legality or illegality may determine the final characterization of a given medical intervention as lawful or unlawful. This is particularly important in such areas as non-therapeutic human medical research and live-donor organ transplantation. This enquiry explores the present situation in Canadian criminal law with respect to the legality of medical interventions and makes some recommendations for change.
A controversial court that still holds its hearing in private will decide tomorrow whether a pregnant woman with learning difficulties should be forcibly sterilised once she gives birth. Health workers from a local NHS trust and council, who cannot be named for legal reasons, have asked the secretive Court of Protection to decide whether the woman should be forced to have her fallopian tubes cut to stop her falling pregnant again.