Amongst the latest, and ever-changing, pathways of death and dying, “suicide tourism” presents distinctive ethical, legal and practical challenges. The international media report that citizens from across the world are travelling or seeking to travel to Switzerland, where they hope to be helped to die. In this paper I aim to explore three issues associated with this phenomenon: how to define “suicide tourism” and “assisted suicide tourism”, in which the suicidal individual is helped to travel to take up the option of assisted dying; the (il)legality of assisted suicide tourism, particularly in the English legal system where there has been considerable recent activity; and the ethical dimensions of the practice. I will suggest that the suicide tourist—and specifically any accomplice thereof—risks springing a legal trap, but that there is good reason to prefer a more tolerant policy, premised on compromise and ethical pluralism.
The House of Lords in Purdy forced the DPP to issue offence-specific guidance on assisted suicide, but Jacqueline A Laing argues that the resulting interim policy adopted last September is unconstitutional, discriminatory and illegal. In July 2009, the law lords in R (on the application of Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] All ER (D) 335 required that the DPP publish guidelines for those contemplating assisting another to commit suicide. The DPP produced a consultation paper (23 September 2009) seeking to achieve a public consensus, albeit outside Parliament, on the factors to be taken into account in determining when not to prosecute assisted suicide. Although the consultation exercise is hailed by proponents of legislative change as a democratic, consensus-building and autonomy-enhancing initiative, there is much to suggest that, on the contrary, the guidance is unconstitutional, arbitrary and at odds with human rights law, properly understood.
Doctors and healthcare professionals could face a higher risk of prosecution if they help patients take their own lives according to new guidelines published by the Director of Public Prosecutions Keir Starmer QC last week. The ‘Policy for Prosecutors in respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide’ comes seven months after the House of Lords ruling in the Purdy case which required the DPP to clarify its approach to assisted dying. The new guidelines follow a consultation which attached 4,710 responses and replace the interim policy issued in September last year with a set of 16 factors in favour of prosecution and six against. The main thrust of the new policy is that individuals driven by compassion will be unlikely to be prosecuted if this was their guiding motive. Those motivated by gain would be.
Following the House of Lords' decision in Purdy, the Director of Public Prosecutions issued an interim policy for prosecutors setting out the factors to be considered when deciding whether a prosecution in an assisted suicide case is in the public interest. This paper considers the interim policy, the subsequent public consultation and the resulting final policy. Key aspects of the policy are examined, including the condition of the victim, the decision to commit suicide and the role of organised or professional assistance. The inclusion of assisted suicides which take place within England and Wales makes the informal legal change realised by the policy more significant than was originally anticipated.
The aim in this paper is to challenge the increasingly common view in the literature that the law on end-of life decision making is in disarray and is in need of urgent reform. The argument is that this assessment of the law is based on assumptions about the relationship between the identity of the defendant and their conduct, and about the nature of causation, which, on examination, prove to be indefensible. A clarification of the relationship between causation and omissions is provided which proves that the current legal position does not need modification, at least on the grounds that are commonly advanced for the converse view. This paves the way for a clarification, in conclusion, of important conceptual and moral differences between withholding, refusing and withdrawing life-sustaining measures, on the one hand, and assisted suicide and euthanasia, on the other.
When faced with a terminal illness, medical professionals, who know the limits of modern medicine, often opt out of life-prolonging treatment. An American doctor explains why the best death can be the least medicated – and the art of dying peacefully, at home
In circumstances where life-sustaining treatment appears merely to be drawing out the inevitable, it is usual practice for the healthcare team to withdraw aggressive life-sustaining measures, once agreement is reached with the patient and their family. Common law gives doctors several defences to allegations of criminality or malpractice in taking the key actions that withdraw treatment and result in the patient's death; however, the legal defensibility of nurses undertaking this role has not been explored. In the absence of a specific body of law related to nurses taking the actions that withdraw life-sustaining treatment, I discuss the probable legal response by consideri
The focus of this article is upon compassionate killings, that is, criminal cases where a parent/spouse has killed or assisted to die a child/spouse who was suffering from severe disabilities, debilitating injury, chronic or terminal illness. We argue that the partial defence of diminished responsibility, while appropriate for some cases, fails to acknowledge the compassionate and relational nature of these acts and thus fails to identify the quality of the harm committed. We also argue that the general defences of duress of circumstances and necessity, even if they were to be become available, are inappropriate. Developing the concept of ‘compassion’, which is a consideration in relation to prosecution for assisted suicide, we argue for the introduction of a partial defence of ‘compassionate killing’ which would reduce the offence from murder to manslaughter in recognition of the killing as a responsive, relational act of care.