The House of Lords in Purdy forced the DPP to issue offence-specific guidance on assisted suicide, but Jacqueline A Laing argues that the resulting interim policy adopted last September is unconstitutional, discriminatory and illegal. In July 2009, the law lords in R (on the application of Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] All ER (D) 335 required that the DPP publish guidelines for those contemplating assisting another to commit suicide. The DPP produced a consultation paper (23 September 2009) seeking to achieve a public consensus, albeit outside Parliament, on the factors to be taken into account in determining when not to prosecute assisted suicide. Although the consultation exercise is hailed by proponents of legislative change as a democratic, consensus-building and autonomy-enhancing initiative, there is much to suggest that, on the contrary, the guidance is unconstitutional, arbitrary and at odds with human rights law, properly understood.
A hospital trust can withhold life-saving treatment from a severely brain-damaged Muslim man if his condition deteriorates, a court has ruled. Doctors argued it would be unfair to resuscitate the patient, known as Mr L, if his condition worsened. His family, of Greater Manchester, said that was against their Muslim faith. At the Court of Protection, Mr Justice Moylan said it would be lawful to withhold treatment as it would not prolong life "in any meaningful way". He added: "It would result in death being characterised by a series of harmful interventions without any realistic prospect of such treatment producing any benefit."
We give Martin permission to appeal against the DPP, although we do not consider that the appeal has any real prospect of success. Our reason for giving permission is the first of the “two other compelling reasons” advanced in the application for permission to appeal. More particularly, we consider that our approach to the role of the DPP and to the decision in Purdy in relation to s2 of the Suicide Act raises questions of sufficient significance to merit consideration by the Court of Appeal.
The question in this case is whether a baby known as X should be removed from a ventilator and made the subject only of palliative care. As the evidence is that he will almost certainly die within minutes, or at best hours, of such removal, it will be readily apparent that this case is both tragic and difficult.
Although DJ's condition is in many respects grim, I am not persuaded that treatment would be futile or overly burdensome, or that there is no prospect of recovery. (a) In DJ's case, the treatments in question cannot be said to be futile, based upon the evidence of their effect so far. (b) Nor can they be said to be futile in the sense that they could only return DJ to a quality of life that is not worth living. (c) Although the burdens of treatment are very great indeed, they have to be weighed against the benefits of a continued existence. (d) Nor can it be said that there is no prospect of recovery: recovery does not mean a return to full health, but the resumption of a quality of life that DJ would regard as worthwhile. The references, noted above, to a cure or a return to the former pleasures of life set the standard unduly high.
This application concerns AW, a 57-year-old woman who is in a permanent vegetative state. It is made by the NHS Trust responsible for her care, which seeks a declaration that it is lawful and in her best interests to withdraw active medical treatment, including specifically artificial nutrition and hydration, albeit that this will lead to AW's death. The application is supported by AW's family, by all the medical staff who look after her, by the evidence of the expert witnesses who have reported, and by the Official Solicitor on behalf of AW herself.
This is an application made by the NHS Foundation Trust in the Court of Protection for a raft of declarations in relation to a young man, M, who was born on 19th June 1990 and so approaches his 23rd birthday. M was tragically born with a congenital abnormality of the brain called holoprosencephaly ("HPE"). It is common ground that in the period of time since 2010 M's condition has significantly deteriorated. He is now seriously malnourished and, in the view of both the treating physicians and independent experts instructed for the purposes of this hearing, reaching the end of his life. The painful and difficult issues now to be faced by M's family, the medical team that have cared for him so diligently over many years, and ultimately this court, is to what extent should M be treated in Intensive Care or be given cardio-pulmonary resuscitation ("CPR") in the event that there is a further deterioration in his condition. There is no question of M having the capacity himself to make...