%0 Journal Article %1 Cassar2007 %A Cassar, Alessandra %D 2007 %J Games Econom. Behav. %K Localnetwork Prisoner'sdilemma Coordination Small-worldnetwork Cooperation Graphtheory Randomnetwork Experiment %N 2 %P 209--230 %R 10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.008 %T Coordination and cooperation in local, random and small world networks: Experimental evidence %V 58 %X A laboratory experiment has been designed to study coordination and cooperation in games played on local, random and small-world networks. For the coordination game, the results revealed a tendency for coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium in all three networks, but the frequency of payoff-dominant choices was significantly higher in small-world networks than in local and random networks. For the prisoner's dilemma game, cooperation was hard to reach on all three networks, with average cooperation lower in small-world networks than in random and local networks. Two graph-theoretic characteristics--clustering coefficient and characteristic path length--exhibited a significant effect on individual behavior, possibly explaining why the small-world network, with its high clustering coefficient and short path length, is the architecture of relations that drive a system towards equilibrium at the quickest pace.

@article{Cassar2007, abstract = {A laboratory experiment has been designed to study coordination and cooperation in games played on local, random and small-world networks. For the coordination game, the results revealed a tendency for coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium in all three networks, but the frequency of payoff-dominant choices was significantly higher in small-world networks than in local and random networks. For the prisoner's dilemma game, cooperation was hard to reach on all three networks, with average cooperation lower in small-world networks than in random and local networks. Two graph-theoretic characteristics--clustering coefficient and characteristic path length--exhibited a significant effect on individual behavior, possibly explaining why the small-world network, with its high clustering coefficient and short path length, is the architecture of relations that drive a system towards equilibrium at the quickest pace.}, added-at = {2011-01-13T13:25:37.000+0100}, author = {Cassar, Alessandra}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/249a3aa6121a3683fe4b08561916c970a/rincedd}, doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.008}, interhash = {9c3041d36199c9695a46b210b2c6ee2d}, intrahash = {49a3aa6121a3683fe4b08561916c970a}, issn = {0899-8256}, journal = {Games Econom. Behav.}, keywords = {Localnetwork Prisoner'sdilemma Coordination Small-worldnetwork Cooperation Graphtheory Randomnetwork Experiment}, number = 2, pages = {209--230}, timestamp = {2011-01-13T13:25:37.000+0100}, title = {Coordination and cooperation in local, random and small world networks: Experimental evidence}, volume = 58, year = 2007 }