There is a definite challenge in the air regarding the pivotal notion
of internal representation.
This challenge is explicit in, e.g., van Gelder, 1995; Beer, 1995;
Thelen & Smith, 1994; Wheeler,
1994; and elsewhere. We think it is a challenge that can be met and
that (importantly) can be met
by arguing from within a general framework that accepts many of the
basic premises of the work
(in new robotics and in dynamical systems theory) that motivates such
scepticism in the first
place. Our strategy will be as follows. We begin (Section 1) by offering
an account (an example
and something close to a definition) of what we shall term Minimal
Robust Representationalism
(MRR). Sections 2 & 3 address some likely worries and questions about
this notion. We end
(Section 4) by making explicit the conditions under which, on our
account, a science (e.g., robotics)
may claim to be addressing cognitive phenomena.
%0 Journal Article
%1 Clark:1999
%A Clark, Andy
%A Grush, Rick
%D 1999
%J Adaptive Behavior
%K anti-representationalism, control, feedback. forward models, motor reactive representation, systems,
%P 5-16
%T Towards a Cognitive Robotics
%V 7
%X There is a definite challenge in the air regarding the pivotal notion
of internal representation.
This challenge is explicit in, e.g., van Gelder, 1995; Beer, 1995;
Thelen & Smith, 1994; Wheeler,
1994; and elsewhere. We think it is a challenge that can be met and
that (importantly) can be met
by arguing from within a general framework that accepts many of the
basic premises of the work
(in new robotics and in dynamical systems theory) that motivates such
scepticism in the first
place. Our strategy will be as follows. We begin (Section 1) by offering
an account (an example
and something close to a definition) of what we shall term Minimal
Robust Representationalism
(MRR). Sections 2 & 3 address some likely worries and questions about
this notion. We end
(Section 4) by making explicit the conditions under which, on our
account, a science (e.g., robotics)
may claim to be addressing cognitive phenomena.
@article{Clark:1999,
abstract = {There is a definite challenge in the air regarding the pivotal notion
of internal representation.
This challenge is explicit in, e.g., van Gelder, 1995; Beer, 1995;
Thelen & Smith, 1994; Wheeler,
1994; and elsewhere. We think it is a challenge that can be met and
that (importantly) can be met
by arguing from within a general framework that accepts many of the
basic premises of the work
(in new robotics and in dynamical systems theory) that motivates such
scepticism in the first
place. Our strategy will be as follows. We begin (Section 1) by offering
an account (an example
and something close to a definition) of what we shall term Minimal
Robust Representationalism
(MRR). Sections 2 & 3 address some likely worries and questions about
this notion. We end
(Section 4) by making explicit the conditions under which, on our
account, a science (e.g., robotics)
may claim to be addressing cognitive phenomena.},
added-at = {2009-06-26T15:25:19.000+0200},
author = {Clark, Andy and Grush, Rick},
biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/26a69dadcdb3bc00085278130e981bcb6/butz},
description = {diverse cognitive systems bib},
interhash = {4479462dfab327ccd260fe7d8debb356},
intrahash = {6a69dadcdb3bc00085278130e981bcb6},
journal = {Adaptive Behavior},
keywords = {anti-representationalism, control, feedback. forward models, motor reactive representation, systems,},
owner = {butz},
pages = {5-16},
timestamp = {2009-06-26T15:25:25.000+0200},
title = {Towards a Cognitive Robotics},
volume = 7,
year = 1999
}