N. Wyatt. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, (2004)
Zusammenfassung
Beall and Restall reject pluralism about metaphysical modality. The paper argues that they cannot coherently do so while maintaining their pluralism about first-order logic.
Beschreibung
2004 What are Beall and Restall pluralists about? AJP « percieve
%0 Journal Article
%1 Wyatt2007
%A Wyatt, Nicole
%D 2004
%J Australasian Journal of Philosophy
%K logical-pluralism
%P 409-420
%T What are Beall and Restall pluralists about?
%U http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=article&issn=0004%2d8402&volume=82&issue=3&spage=409
%V 82
%X Beall and Restall reject pluralism about metaphysical modality. The paper argues that they cannot coherently do so while maintaining their pluralism about first-order logic.
@article{Wyatt2007,
abstract = {Beall and Restall reject pluralism about metaphysical modality. The paper argues that they cannot coherently do so while maintaining their pluralism about first-order logic.},
added-at = {2009-04-19T19:16:11.000+0200},
author = {Wyatt, Nicole},
biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/27335742a46b9589c8d8bc06eb102e6f7/nwyatt},
description = {2004 What are Beall and Restall pluralists about? AJP « percieve},
interhash = {b53604a8263033938b8df26bad44028f},
intrahash = {7335742a46b9589c8d8bc06eb102e6f7},
journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},
keywords = {logical-pluralism},
pages = {409-420},
timestamp = {2009-04-19T19:16:11.000+0200},
title = {What are Beall and Restall pluralists about?},
url = {http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=article&issn=0004%2d8402&volume=82&issue=3&spage=409},
volume = 82,
year = 2004
}