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OPTIMAL CARTEL PRICING IN THE PRESENCE OF AN ANTITRUST AUTHORITY*

. International Economic Review, 46 (1): 145--169 (32 Feb 2005)doi: 10.1111/j.0020-6598.2005.00313.x.

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Organizational Structure and Firm Innovation in a Retail Chain., and . Comput. Math. Organ. Theory, 3 (4): 267-288 (1998)Economics of regulation and antitrust, , and . MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. u.a., 3. ed edition, (2000)The joint profit maximum as a free-entry equilibrium outcome. European Economic Review, 35 (5): 1087--1101 (July 1991)Experimentation and Learning in a Differentiated-Products Duopoly. Journal of Economic Theory, (1995)OPTIMAL CARTEL PRICING IN THE PRESENCE OF AN ANTITRUST AUTHORITY*. International Economic Review, 46 (1): 145--169 (32 02 2005)doi: 10.1111/j.0020-6598.2005.00313.x.The advantageous nature of risk aversion in a three-player bargaining game where acceptance of a proposal requires a simple majority. Economics Letters, 30 (3): 195--200 (September 1989)Some implications of antitrust laws for cartel pricing. Economics Letters, 79 (3): 377--383 (June 2003)Finite rationalizability and cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma. Economics Letters, 23 (3): 233--237 (1987)Co-evolution of firms and consumers and the implications for market dominance, and . Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 29 (1-2): 245--276 (January 2005)The role of party reputation in the formation of policy. Journal of Public Economics, 49 (1): 107--121 (October 1992)