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A Characterization of 2-Player Mechanisms for Scheduling.

, , and . ESA, volume 5193 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, page 297-307. Springer, (2008)

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A Characterization of n-Player Strongly Monotone Scheduling Mechanisms., and . IJCAI, page 568-574. AAAI Press, (2015)Approaching utopia: strong truthfulness and externality-resistant mechanisms., , , and . ITCS, page 221-230. ACM, (2013)A Complete Characterization of Group-Strategyproof Mechanisms of Cost-Sharing., and . ESA (1), volume 6346 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, page 146-157. Springer, (2010)A Characterization of 2-Player Mechanisms for Scheduling., , and . ESA, volume 5193 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, page 297-307. Springer, (2008)Extending Characterizations of Truthful Mechanisms from Subdomains to Domains.. WINE, volume 7090 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, page 408-414. Springer, (2011)A Lower Bound of 1+phi for Truthful Scheduling Mechanisms., and . MFCS, volume 4708 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, page 454-464. Springer, (2007)The Geometry of Truthfulness.. WINE, volume 5929 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, page 340-350. Springer, (2009)Mechanism Design for Scheduling with Uncertain Execution Time., and . AAAI, page 623-629. AAAI Press, (2014)Multi-parameter Mechanism Design under Budget and Matroid Constraints., and . ESA, volume 6942 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, page 192-202. Springer, (2011)Truthfulness on a Budget: Trading Money for Approximation through Monitoring., , and . AAMAS, page 1234-1242. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, (2019)