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Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments.

, and . EC, page 683-712. ACM, (2020)

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Decentralized Reinforcement Learning: Global Decision-Making via Local Economic Transactions., , , , and . ICML, volume 119 of Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, page 1437-1447. PMLR, (2020)Auction Learning as a Two-Player Game., , and . ICLR, OpenReview.net, (2021)Approximation Schemes for a Unit-Demand Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries., , , , and . FOCS, page 220-232. IEEE Computer Society, (2019)Subsidy Allocations in the Presence of Income Shocks., , and . AAAI, page 7032-7039. AAAI Press, (2020)Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments., and . EC, page 683-712. ACM, (2020)Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules with Multiple Prizes., , , , and . EC, page 1082-1100. ACM, (2022)A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract., , , , and . EC, page 323. ACM, (2017)The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget Constrained Buyer: The General Case., and . EC, page 39-40. ACM, (2017)On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms., , and . NeurIPS, (2022)Exponential communication separations between notions of selfishness., , , , and . STOC, page 947-960. ACM, (2021)