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False-name bidding in first-price combinatorial auctions with incomplete information.

, , and . AAMAS, page 541-548. IFAAMAS, (2011)

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False-name-proofness in online mechanisms., , , and . AAMAS, page 753-762. IFAAMAS, (2012)Handling negative value rules in MC-net-based coalition structure generation., , , , , and . AAMAS, page 795-804. IFAAMAS, (2012)Strategy-proof matching with regional minimum quotas., , , , , , and . AAMAS, page 1225-1232. IFAAMAS/ACM, (2014)How is Cooperation/collusion Sustained in Repeated Multimarket Contact with Observation Errors?: (Extended Abstract)., , , and . AAMAS, page 1369-1370. ACM, (2016)False-name-proof Mechanisms for Hiring a Team, , , and . CoRR, (2011)Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions., , , and . AAMAS (1), page 265-272. IFAAMAS, (2009)Secure (M+1) st-Price Auction with Automatic Tie-Break., , , and . INTRUST, volume 9473 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, page 422-437. Springer, (2014)Simulating a N-person Multi-stage Game for Making a State., , and . SEAL, volume 1585 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, page 309-316. Springer, (1998)Controlled School Choice with Soft Bounds and Overlapping Types., , , and . AAAI, page 951-957. AAAI Press, (2015)Repeated Multimarket Contact with Private Monitoring: A Belief-Free Approach., , , and . AAAI, page 2038-2045. AAAI Press, (2020)