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Who gets the Maximal Extractable Value? A Dynamic Sharing Blockchain Mechanism.

, , , , , and . AAMAS, page 2171-2173. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems / ACM, (2024)

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Truthful mechanisms for the location of different facilities., and . AAMAS, page 1613-1614. IFAAMAS/ACM, (2014)Free-Riders in Steiner Tree Cost-Sharing Games., and . SIROCCO, volume 3499 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, page 231-245. Springer, (2005)Utilitarian Mechanism Design for Multi-Objective Optimization., , , and . SODA, page 573-584. SIAM, (2010)Combinatorial auctions without money., , and . AAMAS, page 1029-1036. IFAAMAS/ACM, (2014)Synthetic Data Augmentation for Deep Reinforcement Learning in Financial Trading., , and . ICAIF, page 343-351. ACM, (2022)Model-Agnostic Pricing of Exotic Derivatives Using Signatures., , , and . ICAIF, page 96-104. ACM, (2022)A Mechanism Design Approach to Measure Awareness., , and . AAAI, page 886-892. AAAI Press, (2015)Error in the Euclidean Preference Model., , and . AAMAS, page 2676-2678. ACM, (2023)The Spoofing Resistance of Frequent Call Markets., , , , , , and . AAMAS, page 825-832. International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), (2022)Explicit Payments for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms., and . AAMAS, page 2125-2133. ACM, (2023)