In the legal performance of the euthanasia procedure, unbearable suffering, one of the requirements of due care, is difficult to assess. Evaluation of the current knowledge of unbearable suffering is needed in the ongoing debate about the conditions on which EAS can be approved. Using an integrative literature review, we evaluated publications with definitions of suffering in general or in end-of-life situations and with descriptions of suffering in the context of a request for EAS.
Background : There is only limited knowledge about the emotional impact that performing euthanasia has on primary care physicians (PCPs) in the Netherlands. Results : Various phases with different emotions were distinguished: before (tension), during (loss) and after (relief) the event. Although it is a very rare occurrence, euthanasia has a major impact on PCPs. Their relationship with the patient, their loneliness, the role of the family, and pressure from society are the main issues that emerged. Making sufficient emotional space and time available to take leave adequately from a patient is important for PCPs. Conclusions : Many PCPs stressed that young physicians should form their own opinions about euthanasia and other end-of-life decisions early on in their career. We recommend that these issues are officially included in the vocational training programme for general practice. Palliative Medicine 2007; 21 : 609—614
Conclusions: Where assisted dying is already legal, there is no current evidence for the claim that legalised PAS or euthanasia will have disproportionate impact on patients in vulnerable groups. Those who received physician-assisted dying in the jurisdictions studied appeared to enjoy comparative social, economic, educational, professional and other privileges.
Background In the Netherlands, euthanasia is allowed if physicians adhere to legal requirements. Consultation of an independent physician is one of the requirements. SCEN (Support and Consultation on Euthanasia in the Netherlands) physicians have been trained to provide such consultations. Objective To study why euthanasia requests are sometimes judged not to meet requirements of due care and to find out which characteristics are associated with the SCEN physicians’ judgments. Methods During 5 years (2006, 2008-2011) standardized registration forms were used for data-collection. We used multilevel logistic regression analysis to assess the associations of characteristics and SCEN physicians’ judgments. Results We analyzed 1631 euthanasia requests, involving 415 SCEN physicians. Patient characteristics that were associated with a lower likelihood to meet due care requirements were: being tired with life, depression and not wanting to be a burden. Physical suffering and higher patien
In the Netherlands, euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (PAS) are considered acceptable medical practices in specific circumstances. The majority of cases of euthanasia and PAS involve patients suffering from cancer. However, in 1994 the Dutch Supreme Court in the so-called Chabot-case ruled that “the seriousness of the suffering of the patient does not depend on the cause of the suffering”, thereby rejecting a distinction between physical (or somatic) and mental suffering. This opened the way for further debate about the acceptability of PAS in cases of serious and refractory mental illness. An important objection against offering PAS to mentally ill patients is that this might reinforce loss of hope, and demoralization. Based on an analysis of a reported case, this argument is evaluated. It is argued that offering PAS to a patient with a mental illness who suffers unbearably, enduringly and without prospect of relief does not necessarily imply taking away hope and can be eth...
This paper examines the controversial and complex issues of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (PAS). I begin by defining and distinguishing these two terms and explain how they relate to each other. I also describe the medical doctrine of double effect, in which relieving pain comes at the expense of hastening death. Then, I give a brief overview of the common law defense of necessity, which is practically the sole defense available to or used by physicians accused of committing euthanasia or PAS. Finally, I analyze the legal doctrines of euthanasia and PAS, focusing on legislation and cases in the European Union — primarily the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Switzerland — and the U.S. states of Oregon, Washington, and Montana.
Artsen steunen euthanasie bij dementie Publicatie Nr. 27 - 08 juli 2011 Jaargang 2011 Rubriek NieuwsReflex Auteur Joost Visser, KNMG Pagina's 1684 Een op de vijf artsen steunt het burgerinitiatief van Uit Vrije Wil, een op de drie vindt hulp bij zelfdoding aan patiënten met een chronische depressie of beginnende dementie te rechtvaardigen.
Paar weken geleden een euthanasie gedaan. De patiënt was een hoogbejaarde rechtshandige intelligente vrouw met hartfalen. Ze werd opgenomen met een hemiparese rechts ten gevolge van een diep herseninfarct in de linkerhemisfeer. Ik zag haar op de derde dag na de ictus en er was geen enkele verbetering van de neurologische uitval. Toen ze onomwonden om euthanasie vroeg, kon ik haar eigenlijk direct goed begrijpen en we zijn de procedure ingegaan. Haar stelligheid, dankbaarheid en humor zal ik niet vergeten. Zo’n euthanasie slaat echt een gat. Het contact is intensiever en het einde abrupter dan normaal.
Rurik Löfmark, Tore Nilstun, Colleen Cartwright, Susanne Fische, Agnes van der Heide, Freddy Mortier, Michael Norup, Lorenzo Simonato and Bregje D Onwuteaka-Philipsen for the EURELD Consortium
Results: Laws on assisted dying in The Netherlands and Belgium are restricted to doctors. In principle, assisted suicide (but not euthanasia) is not illegal in either Germany or Switzerland, but a doctor’s participation in Germany would violate the code of professional medical conduct and might contravene of a doctor’s legal duty to save life. The Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill proposed in the UK in 2005 focused on doctors, whereas the Proposal on Assisted Dying of the Norwegian Penal Code Commission minority in 2002 did not. Conclusion: A society moving towards an open approach to assisted dying should carefully identify tasks to assign exclusively to medical doctors, and distinguish those possibly better performed by other professions.
This article examines the reporting requirements in four jurisdictions in which assisted dying (euthanasia and/or assisted suicide) is legally regulated: the Netherlands, Belgium, Oregon and Switzerland. These jurisdictions were chosen because each had a substantial amount of empirical evidence available. We assess the available empirical evidence on reporting and what it tells us about the effectiveness of such requirements in encouraging reporting. We also look at the nature of requirements on regulatory bodies to refer cases not meeting the legal criteria to either prosecutorial or disciplinary authorities. We assess the evidence available on the outcomes of reported cases, including the rate of referral and the ultimate disposition of referred cases.
In their critique of our paper "Legal physician-assisted dying in Oregon and the Netherlands: evidence concerning the impact on patients in "vulnerable" groups," I.G. Finlay and R. George claim to challenge our underlying assumptions and methodology with "another perspective on Oregon's data." In our view, however, they miss the point of our paper and address a quite different issue. While we welcome their attempt to further explore issues about assisted dying, we do not believe they have in any way undercut our argument that where assisted dying is already legal (at the time of our study, Oregon and the Netherlands), there is no current evidence for the claim that legalized physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia will have disproportionate impact on patients in vulnerable groups.
The right not to know is underappreciated in policy-making. Despite its articulation in medical law and ethics, policy-makers too easily let other concerns override the right not to know. This observation is triggered by a recent decision of the Dutch government on embryo selection for Huntington’s disease. People possibly affected with the Huntington gene do not always want to know their genetic status themselves, which is very burdensome knowledge. For prospective parents, this creates a difficulty in having unaffected children through embryo selection without knowing their own genetic status. A solution is provided by the exclusion test: it allows embryo selection while honouring the parents’ right not to know. This article analyses the scope of the right not to know in the context of embryo selection against Huntington’s disease. It concludes that the right not to know implies that PGD against Huntington should be allowed by means of the exclusion test.