Seriously ill children under 16 may be forced to take life-saving medical treatment against their wishes - but only after their maturity and viewpoint have been carefully considered, the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled.
A central tenet to much ethical argument within medical law is patient autonomy. Although we have seen a welcome move away from a system governed by largely unchecked paternalism, there is not universal agreement on the direction in which medical law should advance. Competing concerns for greater welfare and individual freedom, complicated by an overarching commitment to value-pluralism, make this a tricky area of policy-development. Furthermore, there are distinct understandings of, and justifications for, different conceptions of autonomy. In this paper, we argue that in response to these issues, there has been a failure by the courts properly to distinguish political concepts of liberty and moral concepts of autonomy.
The Parliamentary Assembly, referring to its Resolution 1859 (2012) on protecting human rights and dignity by taking into account previously expressed wishes of patients, commends the Committee of Ministers for its foresighted and timely adoption of both the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (Oviedo Convention, ETS No. 164) and Recommendation CM/Rec(2009)11 on principles concerning continuing powers of attorney and advance directives for incapacity.