The implications of recognizing property in our own excised body parts are vast and far reaching, involving ethical, legal and practical issues that cut across many aspects of modern social intercourse and legal regulation. Arguments both for and against such recognition are well rehearsed; enough has been written to fill a small library, or at least a large bookshelf. A significant portion of the work considers the role and impact of such recognition on human dignity. Indeed, given the special status accorded the human body, it is impossible to avoid human dignity and its interaction with the various choices presented by the adoption of a property model. However, reference to this general ethical value is of little assistance. Here, the ethical foundation of a property model is considered within the context of medical ethical four principles, namely autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice. If such a model promotes these principles, it can be ethically defended.
There is legal uncertainty and academic disagreement as to the legal status of biological material that has become separated from the person. This article sets out the two criteria upon which the assessment of the legal status of ‘separated biological material’ ought to be made. Any argument concerning the legal status of separated biological material needs to (i) assess which ownership entitlements in the material the law ought recognize and (ii) assess which set of legal rules ought to be used to protect these ownership entitlements. There are also limits to the way these two criteria ought to operate. First, the considerations that are necessary to justify an ownership entitlement in a body part vary between different types of ownership entitlements. Second, whether there is a necessary connection between recognizing an ownership entitlement and protecting the entitlement in a particular way also varies in terms of the type of ownership entitlement in question.
Biobanks are increasingly seen as new tools for medical research. Their main purpose is to collect, store, and distribute human body materials. These activities are regulated by legal instruments which are heterogeneous in source (national and international), and in form (binding and non-binding). We analyse these to underline the need for a new model of governance for modern biobanks. The protection initially ensured by respect for fundamental rights will need to focus on more interactions with society in order to ensure biobanks' sustainability. International regulation is more oriented on ethical principles and traces the limits of the uses of genetics, while European regulation is more concerned with the protection of fundamental rights and the elaboration of standards for biobanks' quality assurance. But is this protection adequate and sufficient? Do we need to move from the biomedical research analogy to new forms of legal protection, and governance systems which involve citizen
Standards should never come into question, but it's clear to this Government that NHS administrative costs can be streamlined. Estimates suggest that savings of over £180 million could be delivered by 2015 by reducing the number of NHS bodies, including arm's-length bodies. And that is why I set out proposals to change responsibility for regulating fertility treatment and human tissue last week. The UK-wide consultation will consider whether the responsibilities of the regulators - the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) and Human Tissue Authority (HTA) - should move to the Care Quality Commission (CQC) and the Health Research Authority (HRA).